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Separation of Powers: The Appointment
of Bill Lann Lee as Acting Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights
By DAVID L. JORDAN*
I. Introduction
In June, 1997, President Clinton announced he would nominate
Bill Lann Lee for Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.1 The
nomination required the advice and consent of the Senate to become
official.2 By early November, 1997, it became clear that the Republi-
can-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee would vote down the Lee
appointment, forcing committee Democrats to block the vote.3 On
November 13, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Chair of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, called Lee's "nomination 'dead,' because Lee sup-
ports affirmative action and opposes California's Proposition 209."1
To avoid the Senate's rebuke, President Clinton named Bill Lan Lee
"Acting" Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights on December
15, 1997.5
This Note analyzes the separation of powers problem inherent in
such an appointment by looking to the Appointments Clause in the
Constitution6 and the alleged statutory authority supporting such an
appointment.7 Part II of the Note gives a brief chronology of events
leading to Lee's appointment on an acting basis and describes the al-
leged statutory authority for it. Part III looks at the Appointments
Clause in the Constitution,' followed by a discussion of the Framers'
* The author is a 1999 graduate of the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law and an associate at Walsh, Donovan & Keech LLP, San Francisco, California.
1. See Clinton Names Fischer, Lee to Justice Positions, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1997, at
B8.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 506 (1997). See also U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3. See Eva M. Rodriguez and Edward Felsenthal, Vote on Nominee for Civil-Rights
Post Delayed as Clinton's Choice Is in Peril, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1997, at A20.
4. Angie Cannon, Facing Defeat Nominee Sees Gain, Clinton's Pick for Civil Rights
Post Recalls Humble Start, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Nov. 13, 1997, at A23.
5. See John F. Harris and Helen Dewar, President Bypasses Congress, Appoints Lee
on 'Acting' Basis, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1997, at Al.
6. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
7. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-49 (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 509-10, 543 (1994).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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intent. Part IV develops the separation of powers doctrine and ap-
plies it to the facts underlying the Lee appointment. In applying con-
stitutional requirements, and statutory authority for an "acting"
appointment, to the separation of powers doctrine developed by the
Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer9 and subsequent ex-
pressions,' ° it becomes clear that the appointment of Bill Lann Lee as
Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights was an unconstitu-
tional act in violation of the separation of powers.
H. The Chronology of Events and Statutory Authority
A. The Politics Behind the Appointment
Bill Lan Lee, before his nomination and acting appointment to
the civil rights post, was the western regional counsel of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP)
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDEF)." Lee had spent
his entire career with the NAACP's LDEF before leaving to join the
Justice Department. 2 The nomination of Lee was a ground breaking
event, because he would be the first Asian-American to lead the civil
rights division if his nomination was confirmed.' 3
However, it soon became apparent that Senate Republicans on
the Judiciary Committee, who must first pass on the nomination
before sending it to the Senate floor for a vote, appeared more inter-
ested in making the Lee nomination a "referendum on racial prefer-
ences" than acting as the traditional rubber stamp. 4 The Senate
Judiciary Committee openly and critically attacked Lee's support for
overturning California's Proposition 209, which ended racial prefer-
ences in that state.' 5 Members of the Committee were also concerned
with a lawsuit Lee filed against the University of California and the
Department of Education while Lee was heading LDEF's western of-
fice. The suit had alleged that the use of standardized tests was not a
necessary criteria and only served to discriminate against applicants
9. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
10. See, e.g., Public Citizens v. United States, 491 U.S. 440, 482 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). See also, MiEcheal L. Yoder, Separation of Powers: No Longer Simply Hanging
in the Balance, 79 GEO. L. J. 173, 1191 (1990) (arguing for what Yoder calls the hybrid
approach to separation of powers demonstrated by Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Pub-
lic Citizens).
11. See Robert Suro, Police Reformer, Civil Rights Lawyer Named to Top Posts: Justice
Dept. Jobs Slated for L.A. Commission President, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Litigator,
WASH. POST, June 13, 1997, at A27.
12. See id.
13. See id
14. See Clint Bolick, A Vote for Lee is a Vote for Preferences, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27,
1997, at A23.
15. See id.
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on the basis of impermissible characteristics. 6 Senator Hatch stated
that the Republicans on the Judiciary Committee did not oppose
Lee's appointment because he was an Asian-American, but simply be-
cause his record reflects "'a distorted view of the Constitution and the
nation's civil-rights laws."" 7
Lee's nomination thus became an ideological battle ground that
has led some scholars to posit that the history of presidential appoint-
ments - choosing whomever the President wishes and receiving the
Senate's rubber stamp -has come to a significant end,'8 especially in
light of the fact that the chair of the Judiciary Committee considered
Lee to be highly credentialed.' 9 The Senate's digression from its
traditional role in the appointments process prompted President Clin-
ton to threaten a recess appointment, whereby the President could
appoint Lee on an interim basis while Congress was in recess. 20 Lee
could then hold the position through the next session of Congress.2'
Experts on the history of appointments claimed that such a move
would be unprecedented, because no recess appointment has ever fol-
lowed a rebuff by the Senate.22
Senate Republicans quickly responded, asking the President not
to bypass the Senate.' In an effort to compromise, Senate Republi-
cans and the President agreed that making Lee an "acting" appoint-
ment would be less confrontational and less repugnant to the Senate's
role in the appointment process.24 Thus, on December 15, 1997, Presi-
dent Clinton named Bill Lann Lee Acting Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights.25
B. Statutory Authority for the Acting Appointment
The sole statutory authority for appointing an official to a post
requiring the advice and consent of Congress, such as Assistant Attor-
ney General for Civil Rights,26 is the Vacancies Act.27 The Vacancies
16. See id.
17. Rodriguez and Felsenthal, supra note 3, at 1.
18. See Angie Cannon and Robert A. Rankin, Senate Panel's Vote Leaves Civil Rights
Nominee in Limbo Long-Term Question Is: Can a President Function if He Can't Choose
Staff?, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 14, 1997, at A6.
19. See id.
20. See U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 2, cl. 3.
21. See id.
22. See Peter Baker, Clinton to Put Lee in Civil Rights Post: President Prepared to
Bypass Senate, Use Recess Appointment, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1997, at Al.
23. See Clinton to Bypass Senate on Rights Job: GOP Leader Warns President on
Move, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Dec. 15, 1997, at A4.
24. See Brian McGrory, Clinton May Change Lee Strategy: Might Accept 'Acting'
Designation, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 13, 1997, at A9.
25. See Harris and Dewar, supra note 5, at A4.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
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Act, as enacted in 1868 and amended in 1994, is an attempt by Con-
gress "to prevent presidents from undermining the Senate's confirma-
tion prerogative, ' 2 subject only to a recess appointment.29 For
offices requiring advice and consent, the only alternative to the Vacan-
cies Act and the recess appointment is to "'submit a nomination [to]
Congress and await the confirmation process.'" 3 ° As Senators Orrin
Hatch and Robert Byrd stated, "'unlimited acting appointments could
undermine the Senate's constitutional duty and responsibility to ad-
vise and consent on nominations."'31
The Vacancies Act provides in relevant part:
When an officer of a bureau of an Executive Department or
military appointment whose appointment is not vested in the
head of the department, dies, resigns, or is sick or absent, his
first assistant, unless otherwise directed by the President under
section 3347 of this title, shall perform the duties of the office
until a successor is appointed or the absence stops. 32
Section 3347 provides:
Instead of a detail under section 3345 or 3346 of this title,
the President may direct the head of another Executive depart-
ment or military department, whose appointment is vested in the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
perform the duties of the office until a successor is appointed or
the absence.. . stops.33
It is clear from the face of the statute that it does not apply to the
appointment of Bill Lann Lee for two reasons: (1) under section 3346,
Lee was not a "first assistant"34 to the assistant attorney general for
civil rights when appointed to assume the position, and (2) under sec-
tion 3347, Lee was not "the head of another Executive agency or mili-
tary department. ' 35 Moreover, the Vacancies Act could not apply
even if Lee did meet those requirements, because appointments under
sections 3346 and 3347 are limited in duration to 120-days.36 That
120-day period "had been exhausted by the 181-day tenure of then-
27. See Clinton Justice Appointment Was Violation, Agency Says, N.Y. ThMES, Jan. 18,
1998, at A23. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-49 (1994).
28. See Clinton Justice Appointment Was Violation, Agency Says, supra note 27.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.3.
30. Clinton Justice Appointment Was Violation, Agency Says, supra note 27.
31. Helen Dewar, Two Senators Feel Lee Post Carries Limit of 120 Days, BUFF. NEWS,
Dec. 21, 1997, at A9. Senator Byrd is a Democrat from West Virginia.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 3346.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (1994) (emphasis added). This section specifically excludes from
its coverage the office of the Attorney General, whose vacancy is covered by 28 U.S.C.
section 508. However, section 508 does not cover inferior officers in the Justice Depart-
ment. Thus, the assistant attorney general post would be covered by this section. Id.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 3346.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 3347.
36. See 5 U.S.C. § 3348 (1994).
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Acting Assistant Attorney General Isabelle Pinzler before Mr. Clin-
ton announced Mr. Lee's appointment. '37
Moreover, in Williams v. Phillips,38 the court held that "a Presi-
dential power to appoint officers temporarily in the face of statutes
requiring their appointment to be confirmed by the Senate... would
avoid the nomination and confirmation process of officers in its en-
tirety. Constitutional provisions cannot be given such an interpreta-
tion."' 39 Accordingly, because an acting appointment of Lee would
violate the Vacancies Act, it would also violate the Constitution and
be in sharp incongruence with the doctrine of separation of powers.4°
Even if Lee did qualify for an acting post, his powers would be
severely limited. In United States v. Harmon Northrop Swanson,41 the
court held that the Acting Assistant Attorney General could not au-
thorize a wiretap, because the wiretapping statute makes clear that the
authority to authorize a wiretap is limited to named officials in the
statute, and "[u]ntil an Assistant Attorney General designate has been
confirmed by the Senate, he does not qualify."'42 Assuming Lee could
be named on an acting basis, his powers would thus be circumscribed.
Accordingly, the Justice Department in early January, 1998, be-
gan to argue that "the Vacancies Act did not apply [to Lee's appoint-
ment] because the Attorney General had authority to fill such
positions for unspecified periods."'43 What statutory authority the At-
torney General has to fill the position can only be speculated at, since
the Justice Department has been coy in giving relevant details. Pre-
sumably the argument would be that the Attorney General appointed
Lee to a position like "special attorney,"44 which does not require the
advice and consent of Congress, and then delegated the powers of the
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights upon him under 28 U.S.C.
section 510.4-
37. Clinton Justice Appointment Was Violation, Agency Says, supra note 27.
38. 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.C. Dist. 1973).
39. hM at 1369.
40. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,585 (1952) ("The Pres-
ident's power. . . must stem either from an act of Congress of from the Constitution it-
self"). Here, President Clinton had neither statutory nor constitutional authority to
appoint Lee on an acting basis. Defendants in Youngstown argued that the President has
inherent powers that reside in the President's authority to see that the laws are faithfully
executed or because the power of the Executive is his alone, but those arguments were
rejected by the Court. See iL at 587-88; see also U.S. CONsT. art. II, §§1, 3, cl. 1.
41. 399 F. Supp. 441 (D.C. Dist. 1975).
42. Id. at 443.
43. Clinton Justice Appointment Was Violation, Agency Says, supra note 27.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 543 (1994).
45. "The Attorney General may from time to time make such provisions as he consid-
ers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee, or agency of
the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General." 28 U.S.C. § 510
(1994). The Attorney General possesses "[a]Il functions of other officers of the Depart-
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A court would likely strike down this action. The Vacancies Act
was passed and amended to prevent such fast and loose play with the
advice and consent clause. It specifically provides the sole avenue for
the temporary filling of vacancies requiring the "advice and consent"
of the Senate.4 6 An appointment in contravention of the Vacancies
Act, and without explicit support therefor in the Constitution, would
be an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.47
III. Appointments Clause: What it Requires and the
Framers' Intent
The Constitution provides that the President shall be vested with
the power to "nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law," unless the Senate specifically delegates the
power of appointment to the President alone or some other depart-
ment head.48 The President enjoys constitutional authority to "fill up
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Ses-
sion. ' 49 Alexander Hamilton noted, when considering this language
in his Federalist Paper number 76, that:
It has been observed.. . 'that the true test of a good gov-
ernment is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good adminis-
tration.' If the justness of this observation be admitted[,] the
mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained
in the foregoing clauses must, when examined, be allowed to be
entitled to particular commendation. 50
Hamilton believed that the Appointments Clause, as written in
the new Constitution, then under consideration and subsequently
adopted, would lead to a "judicious choice.., in filling offices of the
Union."51 Moreover, he felt it went without argument that the above
point "essentially depend[ed] [on] the character of its administra-
tion."'5 In essence, the argument was that this format for appointing
federal officials, if strictly followed, would lead to the creation of an
ment of Justice and all functions of agencies and employees of the Department of Justice
are vested in the Attorney General .... 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1994).
46. See discussion infra. at 109-10.
47. See Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (D.C. Dist. 1973).
48. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
49. Id- at cl. 3.
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
51. Id
52. Id
effective and prudent administration to lead the Union. 3
The Framers of the Constitution also believed that this format -
Presidential nomination subject to the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate - would properly satisfy their underlying desire for separation of
powers. Early opponents of the Constitution, on the other hand,
sought instead to have the sole appointment power reside in the Presi-
dent alone. 4 The Framers, however, explicitly rejected this argument,
noting that splitting the power of appointment would avoid a monop-
oly of power accruing in the Executive, such as that possessed by the
British Monarch.5 5 The Framers' objective was narrowly circum-
scribed to avoid the aggrandizement of the appointments power and
thus retain the balance of power between the Executive and
Congress. 6
The Framers' intent becomes manifest when one examines their
explicit rationale. "It will be the office of the President to nominate,
and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint .... [The
Senate] may defeat one choice of the Executive... but they cannot
themselves choose - they can only ratify or reject .... ,17 The Senate
may overrule the Executive choice, but only to make a "place for an-
other nomination. '58 The person eventually appointed will be of the
President's preference, even if not the first in degree.59 The process
thus results in an appointment agreeable to both the Executive and
the Senate, with neither gaining a distinct advantage over the other in
relation to policy development and ideology.
The Framers also answered critics who believed either (1) the
President would have too much influence over the Senate under the
proposed regime, or (2) that the Senate would possess too much influ-
ence over the President. With regard to the former, Hamilton ob-
served that should the entire appointment power reside in the
Executive, it would "enable him much more effectually to establish a
dangerous empire over [the Senate], than a mere power of nomination
subject to their control. '60 With regard to the latter he said: neither
53. See L
54. Id.
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 420-21 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.
1961). No. 69 provides an intriguing comparison between the structure and function of the
British and New York systems of Executive appointments and that of the Constitution, at
least as they perceived it functioning if enacted.
56. See Samuel W. Cooper, Considering "Power' in Separation of Powers, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 361, 362-63 (1994).
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,
1961).
58. THE FEDERAusrT No. 76, supra note 50, at 457.
59. Id.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 460 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,
1961).
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would the Senate's influence over the President be so dangerous, for
"[i]f by influencing the President be meant restraining him, this is pre-
cisely what must have been intended. ' 61 Hamilton believed "[t]he
right of nomination would produce all the good, without the ill,' 62
because it would lead to a more "efficacious" and stable administra-
tive regime,6 3 and would avoid the pitfalls of aggrandizement.
What can be gleaned from the language and history of the Ap-
pointments Clause? How does it reflect on the action taken by Presi-
dent Clinton?
First, Congress alone has the authority to provide for the appoint-
ment of inferior officers.65 The Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights is such an inferior officer. Congress required that the civil
rights post be filled by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.66
Second, Congress can vest in the President or other department
head the power to appoint such inferior officers.67 Congress created
an exception to the advice and consent requirement for certain Execu-
tive agents, including the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
which allows the President to fill a vacancy in the post for 120-days
with the head of another department whose appointment is vested in
the President by and with the advice and consent of Congress.6" Con-
gress has provided for no other method of filling the civil rights post.
It follows therefrom that, if the President appoints one to a post
without constitutional or statutory authority, it violates not only the
language of the Constitution, but the Framers' clear intent to have
separation of powers between the Executive and Congress that stifles
the accumulation of political power in one branch.6 9 President Clin-
ton's appointment of Mr. Lee as "Acting" Attorney General for Civil
Rights violated both, for he lacked the constitutional or statutory au-
thority for his action and usurped the Senate's constitutionally granted
power by bypassing the approval process dictated by the advice and
consent clause.70 As a result, the President has violated the underly-
ing principle of the Constitution - separation of powers.
61. Id
62. Id.
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, supra note 50, at 457.
64. See Cooper, supra note 56 at 362-63.
65. See U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
67. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
68. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 334748 (1994).
69. See discussion infra at part II.
70. See generally, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 66,76,77 (Alexander Hamilton). See discus-
sion infra at 117-121.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
IV. The Separation of Powers Doctrine and its Application
to the "Acting" Appointment of Bill Lann Lee
A. The Doctrine
1. The Federalist Perspective
The Founders' perspective provides insight into the jurisprudence
of separation of powers.7 ' James Madison is responsible for guiding
our inquiry into the Framers' conception of separation of powers un-
derlying the Constitution.72 Madison began by clarifying what is
meant by the maxim "separation of powers": it does not mean "that
these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control
over, the acts of each other."73 He decried a clear split between the
powers of one department and that of another, because such an ap-
proach would actually undermine the power of each branch to control
aggrandizement by the others.74 Madison argued that "unless these
departments be so far connected and blended [so] as to give each a
constitutional control over the others," the separation of powers re-
quired for an effective and just government "can never in practice be
duly maintained."'75
The Framers fought for a government founded on "free princi-
ples, '76 but also one that devolved powers to each branch. Such pow-
ers of the government would in general be "so divided and balanced
among several bodies.., that no one could transcend their legal limits
without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. '77 What
appears to emerge from the words of Madison is not a strict separa-
tion of powers, but what has become commonly known and revered as
a system of checks and balances.7" Thus, because the Framers be-
lieved a facial split would fail,7 9 the "mutual relations" of the branches
- their interior structure - must keep each other in "their proper
places."8 0
The only way to secure the three branches from the steady con-
centration of power by one branch is to give each branch the constitu-
71. See Cooper, supra note 56, at 367.
72. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (James Madison).
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
Madison believed that Montesquieu's conception of Separation of Powers was only that
when the "whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess
the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution
are subverted." Id. at 302-03.
74. See T-m FEDERALST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
75. IdL
76. Id. at 311. (emphasis added).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. See Cooper, supra note 56, at 364.
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
80. Id.
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tional means and motives to resist such aggrandizement by the
others.8 1 The defense, however, must be "commensurate to the dan-
ger of attack." 2 For example, the veto power possessed by the Exec-
utive8 3 and the advice and consent power bestowed upon the Senate'
are explicit defenses in the Constitution.85 However, Madison noted
that in a republican form of government, the defenses can never be
equal because the legislature "necessarily predominates. 8 6 Thus,
though the Executive has the veto power, it can be overridden by a
two-thirds vote of both houses.8 7
The paradigm created by the Framers of checks and balances is
evident in the language and function of the Appointments Clause, dis-
cussed above.8 The President is vested with the authority to nomi-
nate, but must appoint "by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate," unless Congress provides otherwise for inferior officers.8 9
But the Senate cannot appoint its own preference; rather, the person
appointed will be of the President's preference, even if not the first in
degree.90 In essence, the Appointments Clause is the epitome of the
checks and balances approach to separation of powers envisioned by
the Framers.
The Framers' exposition on the principles of separation of powers
"does little to inform decisions concerning where certain powers
should rest, the degree of separateness desired, or the protections nec-
essary to ensure the maintenance of separate departments." 91 Nor did
the Framers leave us with any dominant guiding theoretical paradigm
for solving separation of powers problems,92 because the checks and
balances approach was strictly one of compromise. 93 What it does do,
however, is provide "insights to guide separation of powers
jurisprudence. ''94
81. See id. at 321-22.
82. Id. at 322.
83. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
84. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
85. Cf. Cooper, supra note 56, at 364-65.
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 79, at 322.
87. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2.
88. See discussion infra. Part III.
89. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
90. See THE FEDERALIST No. 76, supra note 50, at 457.
91. Cooper, supra note 56, at 366.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 364.
94. Id. at 367.
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2. The Modem Judicial Approach to Separation of Powers Issues as
Exposed in Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Co.95
The Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. considered whether
President Truman's order to seize the nation's steel mills in light of an
impending strike by the union was a violation of the separation of
powers.96 The Court's separation of powers jurisprudence essentially
arose from Justice Black's opinion, which gave rise to the formalist
approach,97 and Justice Jackson's concurrence that gave rise to the
functionalist analysis.98
Justice Black's analysis began with the proposition that "[t]he
President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."99 There was no statu-
tory authority on which the President could rely."°° In fact, Congress
had explicitly considered giving the President such power when con-
sidering the Taft-Hartly Act, but refused to do so.1°1 Thus, Black's
analysis turned to whether the President had constitutional authority
to issue the order.1 °2
The Constitution clearly did not give the President express au-
thority for his action.103 The President, however, argued that his au-
95. This Note, and this section in particular, is not intended as a critique of the
Separation of Powers doctrine developed by the Supreme Court over the years. There are
many scholarly articles and books on this subject, which are well beyond the scope of this
note. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and The Idea of
Independence, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 301 (1989); Alan B. Morrison, A Non-Power Look
at Separation of Powers, 79 Geo. L. J. 281 (1990). Rather, it describes the basic doctrines of
formalism and functionalism revealed in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952). In the following section, the traditional test will be applied to the facts before
us, in order to determine whether the appointment of Bill Lann Lee violated the
separation of powers doctrine. This Note does not delve through the history of Separation
of Powers jurisprudence for two reasons. First, the scope of this Note is only to apply the
basic doctrines now used by the Court, whether formalism or functionalism, and to argue
simply that the Lee appointment is a clear violation of Separation of Powers. Second,
there are no Separation of Powers cases on point. The case law has not been developed in
the area of appointments and its relation to Separation of Powers. Rather, the Court has
focused on the removal power of the President. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). But these cases
help little in analyzing the appointment side of the equation because they deal with an area
not expressly covered by the language and history of the Constitution like the
Appointments Clause in article II, § 2.
96. 343 U.S. at 582.
97. See id.
98. See iL at 634.
99. Id. at 585.
100. See id.
101. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,61 Stat. 136, 152-56,29 U.S.C. §§ 141,
171-180 (1994); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 586.
102. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S at 587-89.
103. See id. at 587.
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thority for the seizure could be implied from the aggregate of his
power.104 The President relied on the following language: "'The exec-
utive Power shall be vested in a President. . .'; that 'he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed'; and that he 'shall be Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."1 05
First, Justice Black rejected the "Commander in Chief" argument
on grounds that even in that capacity the President could not take
possession of private property in an effort to counter domestic labor
disputes.0 6 Justice Black perceived that responsibility to be for the
"Nation's [Congress,] not for its military authorities."' 0 7 Second, he
rejected the "executive power" argument, because "the President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws . . . and the
[veto]."' 0 8 In conclusion, Justice Black argued that the lawmaking au-
thority, and the ability to set policy for dealing with domestic labor
disputes, resides solely in the Congress.109 The President can only
faithfully execute the laws created by Congress.1 0 For the President
to impinge on Congress' domain was a violation of separation of
powers.
It has been argued that Black's formalistic approach is centered
on Montesquieu's warning about the accumulation of power in a sin-
gle branch."' Therefore, the formalist doctrine requires that the text
of the Constitution be interpreted "strictly and literally to keep each
branch of government from disturbing the constitutionally granted
powers of the others.""' 2 The Constitution's text "helps resolve sepa-
ration of powers issues touching upon powers expressly enumerated,
or expressly prohibited, therein.""' 3 Thus, under the formalist ap-
proach, where the Constitution's language is clear, all that is required
of the Court is to strictly interpret the language and apply it to the
facts before it. The same is true when Congress has spoken on the
issue.
Justice Jackson's concurrence rejects Black's inflexible approach
in favor of a balancing approach." 4 Under Jackson's balancing ap-
104. See id.
105. Id
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 588.
110. See id.
111. See id. See Yoder, supra note 10, at 177.
112. Id.
113. Cooper, supra note 56, at 367.
114. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
proach, if the action does not disturb the "core function" of another
branch, it does not violate separation of powers." 5 Jackson believed
governing under the Constitution could not be conformed to strict ju-
dicial interpretations of power and isolated clauses in the Constitution
because the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.""' 6 Therefore, power in
the separate branches will fluctuate." 7
In order to accommodate these realities, Justice Jackson devel-
oped a three tier analysis for examining separation of powers
problems." 8 The first tier indicates that "[w]hen the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his au-
thority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate." 1 9 Jackson recognized
that President Truman's order did not fall within this tier, because
Congress had expressly rejected such power.'20
The second tier of Jackson's analysis says that "[w]hen the Presi-
dent acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of au-
thority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. 1 21 Jackson argues
that this tier does not apply either, because "Congress has not left
seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three
statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure."' 22
The third tier says that "[w]hen the President takes measures in-
compatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power
is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter."' In the third tier of analysis, President Truman's seizure
order resided.' 4 According to Jackson, "[c]ourts can sustain exclusive
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject."'5
Jackson first rejected the "executive Power" argument. He ar-
gued that the Framers most certainly looked to the great powers pos-
sessed by King George IIl, and surely did not mean to emulate those
115. See Cooper, supra note 63, at 368.
116. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 635-38.
119. Id. at 635.
120. See id. at 638.
121. Id. at 637.
122. Id. at 639.
123. Id. at 637.
124. See id. at 640.
125. Id. at 637-38.
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in the President of the United States.126 He believed the grant of "ex-
ecutive power" was rather a "generic" grant, probably having more to
do with ministerial necessity than anything else. 27
Jackson next rejected the "Commander in Chief" argument. He
believed that the President's deployment of troops to Korea was not
in itself enough to give rise to the domestic authority to seize and
possess the steel mils.128 In other words, the President could not in-
vest in himself the war powers entrusted to Congress. 29 The Consti-
tution gives "'Congress the power to 'raise and support Armies' and
'to provide and maintain a Navy.'"130 According to Jackson, this in-
cludes the power to see that steel mills supply steel.' 3 '
Finally, Justice Jackson rejected the language "'he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.' "132 Jackson weighed these
words against those of the Fifth Amendment due process clause and
concluded that "ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we
submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules."'
1 33
Justice Jackson was not concerned that the single seizure would
"plunge us straightway into dictatorship," but that it was "at least a
step in that wrong direction."'31 4 Congress must remain, in his view,
able to check the President in a system of check and balances. 5 Con-
gress had spoken on the matter, and thus the Court had to affirm its
ability to check the President, so long as the President did not possess
independent constitutional authority for his action.
The two approaches just described have dominated separation of
powers jurisprudence since 1952. That has not changed even today.
Accordingly, the appointment of Bill Lann Lee will be reviewed sub-
ject to the principles set forth in Justice Black and Justice Jackson's
opinions in Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Co. v. Sawyer.1
6
B. The President's Appointment of Mr. Lee as "Acting" Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights Violated the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers
Beginning with the formalist approach to separation of powers, it
must first be asked whether there is a specific grant of power in the
126. See id. at 641.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 642.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 643.
131. See id.
132. Id at 646.
133. Id
134. Id. at 653.
135. See id. 653-54.
136. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Constitution concerning the question at hand - the appointment of
Bill Lann Lee. The obvious answer is yes. Article II of the Constitu-
tion clearly provides for the appointment of inferior officers such as
the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights:
[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint .. all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Of-
ficers, as they think proper, in the President alone .... 137
Congress did create such inferior officers, including the Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights. 138 Congress provided, however,
that the civil rights post was an office requiring the advice and consent
of the Senate.1 39 Here, Bill Lann Lee was nominated for that post and
the Senate Republicans rebuked him, forcing Senate Democrats to
block the final vote of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 40 Rather
than accept the Senate's constitutional authority to refuse to confirm
the nomination, President Clinton then appointed Lee on an acting
basis.' 41
Congress' advise and consent is required for the appointment of
acting Assistant Attorney General. 42 This was mandated by the Va-
cancies Act. 43 However, as discussed above, the President ignored
the requirements of the Vacancies Act in appointing Lee.'" Such bla-
tant disregard for authority expressly delegated to Congress by the
Constitution is a clear violation of separation of powers. 45 Likewise,
any circuitous attempt by the Attorney General to appoint Lee or as-
sign him the duties of the civil rights post, without requiring either
advice and consent or meeting the requirements of the Vacancies Act,
is a violation of separation of powers. Congress has explicitly pro-
vided the two ways in which the civil rights post could be filled accord-
ing to its powers under Article I, clause 2: (1) advice and consent, or
(2) compliance with the Vacancies Act. 46 Congress authorized no
other route by which the President or the Attorney General could fill
the position of assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. Thus, as in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Co., the President has no constitutional or
137. U.S. CONST. art IH, § 2, cl. 2.
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 506.
139. See id.
140. See discussion infra, Part IH-A.
141. See i
142. See discussion infra, Part II-B.
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3345-49.
144. See discussion infra, Part 11-B.
145. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-88 (1952).
146. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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statutory authority on which to rely, 47 exposing the appointment as a
violation of the separation of powers.
Justice Jackson's three tier approach would lead to the same con-
clusion. Again, as in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Co., the actions here
would fall under the third tier. The President would have to show that
Congress would be prohibited from acting in the area and that he, as
the Executive, possessed independent constitutional powers to take
the action he did.'48 However, the President cannot make such a
showing, because the language of the Constitution in Article II is
clear: Congress may provide for the appointment of inferior officers in
the manner it sees fit.149 The power to set the policy for appointing
officers of the United States rests solely in the Congress and nowhere
else.
As Justice Jackson so eloquently noted, "ours is a government of
laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under
rules."'150 Moreover, he noted that he was not concerned that the sin-
gle seizure of another branch's power would "plunge us straightway
into dictatorship," but that it was simply a step in the wrong direc-
tion. 5 ' Such a facial attack on Congress' power under the Constitu-
tion to establish the rule for appointing inferior officers, such as Lee,
is a step in the wrong direction. Thus, even under the functionalist
approach of Justice Jackson, the President's actions must be struck
down as violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. This result
is in accord with the Framers' intent to establish a government based
theoretically on a notion of checks and balances between the three
branches of the federal government.
Conclusion
President Clinton's appointment of Bill Lann Lee as Acting As-
sistant Attorney General for Civil Rights was a clear violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers. The President's "Acting" appoint-
ment was contrary to the Vacancies Act, which Congress passed under
its Article II, section 2, appointments power. Congress alone was
vested with the power to determine the manner of appointments for
inferior officers, such as of the civil rights post, and the President's
only duty was to comply. The President did not comply with the ex-
plicit constitutional grant of authority and, therefore, violated the doc-
trine separation of powers in appointing Lee on an "Acting" basis.
147. See id.
148. See discussion infra, Part IV-B.
149. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
150. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Co., 343 U.S. at 646.
151. Id. at 653.
